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CERCLA, STATE LAW, AND FEDERALISM
IN THE 21 CENTURY
Alexandra B. Klass*
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, I left a partnership at a large Minneapolis law firm for
academia. During my time in private practice, I focused primarily on
environmental, natural resources, and land use litigation and had the
opportunity to try two unrelated cases in federal court that involved claims
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), the Minnesota Environmental Response and
Liability Act ("MERLA"), and state common law theories of nuisance,
trespass, negligence, and strict liability. Both lawsuits involved claims for
recovery of response costs and damages arising from contaminated property
by one private party against another private party. Thus, unlike the early
CERCLA cases which were generally brought by the federal or state
government or both and often involved multiple parties, these cases
involved government entities and officials only as third-party witnesses and
did not involve complicated PRP groups, government settlements, orphan
shares, and the like. In each case, one corporation had spent money
remediating contaminated property and was seeking to recover those costs
as well as other damages from another corporation.
I learned many lessons from these two cases, three of which were
particularly relevant as I began a career in legal academia focusing on
environmental law, natural resources law, torts, and property. First, in
cases where a cleanup is relatively modest and does not involve a major
industrial site, landfill, or similar property with a history of heavy
contamination and hundreds of millions of dollars of remediation costs, the
* Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Professor Klass
served as counsel in both the Union Pacific v. Reilly Industries case and the Kennedy Building
Associates v. Viacom case while at Dorsey & Whitney LLP. The views expressed in this essay
reflect only the views of Professor Klass and not the positions of Dorsey & Whitney LLP or its
clients. Brad Hammer provided excellent research assistance.
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real "money" in the case is often not in the cleanup costs one can recover
under CERCLA or state superfund laws. Instead, it is in the damages that
are potentially recoverable, including punitive damages, under state
common law claims such as nuisance, negligence, or strict liability.
Second, as complicated and convoluted as CERCLA and the related laws
governing hazardous substance contamination appear to lawyers, courts,
law students, and the business community, with good lawyers and judges
and a comprehensive set of jury instructions, juries are capable of
understanding and applying the differences between federal and state
liability standards in this area to a particular set of facts. Third, simply
because a set of federal standards under CERCLA and a set of state
standards under common law or state statutory law might provide for
different types of relief for the same harm, all of the various standards can
be applied without resulting in multiple recoveries or interfering with
CERCLA or state cleanup goals. Because the relevant provisions of
CERCLA and related state laws are merely legal vehicles for recovering
costs associated with past contamination, as opposed to legal frameworks
that set standards of current conduct to prevent future pollution like the
Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, or Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, the potential for conflict between state and federal law is significantly
lessened.
These lessons have led me to a few conclusions relevant to this essay.
First, state law remains extremely important to lawyers and litigants in the
area of environmental law, including the laws governing contaminated
property, despite the expansive growth of the federal regulatory state in this
area. Second, the court system and the jury system can reach supportable
results based on facts and law in complicated environmental cases
involving overlapping state and federal environmental laws. Third,
principles of federalism that promote a robust role for state statutory and
common law is acceptable and desirable in the law governing contaminated
property.
A few caveats are important at this point. First, many CERCLA cases,
including most CERCLA cases highlighted in legal textbooks, involve
multiple parties, hundreds of millions of dollars in cleanup costs, years of
discovery and negotiations, and few jury trials. Thus, my two small, two-
party jury cases are not on their own representative of the thirty years of
CERCLA litigation. Second, simply because two juries appear to have
been able to see and apply the differences in federal and state liability
standards does not mean that is always the case; in fact I am quite certain
juries have erred in this regard on many occasions. Nevertheless, despite
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these caveats, when I first began law teaching and reading environmental
law textbooks, I was quite surprised at the cursory treatment of state law.
Most textbooks in 2004 spent very little time on state environmental law,
treating it mostly as historic artifact. The basic story was that state law, and
particularly state common law, was something that litigants relied on in the
past because that was all there was. It didn't work very well, so Congress
enacted critical federal environmental laws in the 1970s, the EPA was
created, and now we have the federal environmental administrative state
that overshadows everything we do. While that story certainly was true, it
lacked a full account of the continuing importance of state law in many
areas, but particularly in the area of contaminated property where nuisance,
trespass, and strict liability claims remained central to many actual
contaminated property disputes.
Only a few years later, of course, the environmental law textbooks
changed significantly. This was to account for the climate change lawsuits
then being filed throughout the country, many of which were based on state
common law nuisance and other state law theories of recovery. Today's
environmental law textbooks now generally have significant sections on
climate change nuisance litigation and use this area of law as an example of
the importance of state common law and regulation in situations, like
climate change, where the federal government has failed to act or has not
acted as aggressively as the states. Despite this focus on state law in the
area of climate change, however, it is important to recognize the critical role
of state law even in areas where the federal government has played a central
role for decades.
While I and other scholars have written in the past about the continuing
importance of state law within the field of environmental law, the goal of
this essay is simply to provide additional context for this position by
detailing how overlapping federal and state claims in the area of
contaminated property litigation have played out in two cases. Part I gives
a brief overview of CERCLA, state superfund laws, and the state common
law claims that generally arise in contaminated property cases. It also
describes briefly the current disputes over whether federal remedies under
CERCLA should preempt similar state remedies. Part II describes the case
study lawsuits in detail, with particular emphasis on the relationship
between the federal and state claims and the jury instructions and special
verdicts in each case. Part III provides some observations about the role of
state law in this area and concludes that while state law remains an
important part of many aspects of environmental law, it has a particularly
significant role in the field of contaminated property law.
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I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE GOVERNING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY
This Part provides a basic introduction to CERCLA and state statutory
and common law governing the means of recovering costs and damages
associated with the remediation of contaminated property. Section A
discusses CERCLA, Section B covers state statutory claims, and Section C
explores state common law tort theories of recovery. Finally, Section D
shows how courts have struggled to set the parameters of when CERCLA
should displace or "preempt" state common law claims for relief on
grounds that such claims conflict with or stand as obstacles to achieving
CERCLA's goals. This Part thus sets the stage for the discussion in Part II
of the case studies exploring how the various federal and state law claims
interacted with each other in litigation through dispositive motions, jury
trials, and on appeal.
A. CERCLA
CERCLA, also known as "Superfund,"' was enacted in 1980 to create a
federal framework to address the problems associated with the existence of
hazardous substances in the environment. Although, CERCLA's legislative
history is not a model of clarity, most courts and commentators agree that
two overarching purposes of the statute were to facilitate the remediation of
hazardous waste sites and to make the polluter pay the costs of cleanup.2
Indeed, CERCLA's legislative history is full of facts and horror stories
justifying the need for federal legislation to address a national crisis
associated with abandoned hazardous waste facilities like "Love Canal" and
"Valley of the Drums."3
Unlike other environmental laws that govern the generation,
1. The term "Superfund" is from the five-year, $1.6 billion Hazardous Substances Response
Trust Fund created to finance cleanups at CERCLA's inception. See 28 U.S.C. § 9507
(establishing fund). Superfund is funded by special taxes on oil and chemical companies and
other businesses and supplemented by general revenues, as well as cleanup costs recovered from
responsible parties. See SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT,
CLEANUP, LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 12.03[3] (2010).
2. See Mehrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (stating that the two main
purposes of CERCLA are "prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup
costs on the responsible party.") (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc.,
920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8h Cir. 1990)); Ronald Aronovsky, A Preemption Paradox: Preserving the
Role of State Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 280-81 (2008)
(discussing purposes of CERCLA and citing cases).
3. See Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 903, 926-29
(2004) (discussing CERCLA's legislative history).
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management, and disposal of hazardous materials and waste, CERCLA
provides a vehicle for the federal government, state and local governments,
tribes, and private parties to recover costs associated with contamination
that occurred in the past, often decades ago, during a time when there were
few requirements associated with the disposal of hazardous substances.4
Specifically, CERCLA provides that any private or governmental entity
may sue under section 107(a) to recover for any "release"' of a "hazardous
substance,"6 from a "facility,"7 resulting in "response costs,"8 so long as
those costs are incurred in a manner consistent with the National
Contingency Plan ("NCP"). The NCP is a set of federal regulations which
provides the procedures that the EPA and private parties must follow in
selecting and conducting response actions if the party conducting the
cleanup wishes to recover those costs from responsible parties under
CERCLA.' The NCP requirements associated with "removal actions" and
"remedial actions" are quite different, to account for the different nature of
each response cleanup. A removal action is a short-term action to deal with
an emergency-type situation in order to diminish the immediate threat of a
hazardous waste site.' 0 Such an action is generally done fairly quickly to
stabilize the site and remove an immediate threat to human health and the
environment." A remedial action is a long-term cleanup designed to
permanently eliminate any threat a site may pose and can take years or
decades to complete. 12  Because a remedial action is a long-term, more
4. See id at 920-23 (discussing CERCLA's liability provisions).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2006) (defining "release").
6. Id. § 9601(14) (defining "hazardous substance").
7. Id. § 9601(9) (defining "facility").
8. Id. § 9601(25) defining "response").
9. See id. § 9607(a) (setting forth prima facie case for CERCLA recovery); Klass, supra
note 3, at 920-23 (discussing CERCLA's liability provisions). Section 107(a)(4) of CERCLA
provides that a responsible person under CERCLA is liable for all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by a federal or state governmental entity that are "not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan" and is liable for any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person (i.e., a private party or local government) "consistent with the national contingency
plan." See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). Courts have interpreted this provision to mean that the
defendant bears the burden of proof that costs are not consistent with the NCP in an action brought
by a federal or state entity and the plaintiff bears the burden of proof that costs are consistent with
the NCP in an action brought by a local government or private party.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (defining "remove" and "removal"); see also id. § 9604(2)
(requiring a "removal action" to contribute to a "long term remedial action").
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
12. Id. § 9601(24) (2006) (defining "remedy" and "remedial action"); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.410-
300.415 (2010) (providing regulation for removal action); id. §§ 300.435-300.440 (2010)
(providing regulation for remedial action).
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permanent remedy, the NCP requirements associated with remedial actions,
particularly with regard to report preparation, notice, and public comment,
are more burdensome than the requirements associated with removal
actions.1 Specifically, for a remedial action, the party conducting the
action must prepare a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study prior to
proceeding with the remedy, and must also provide the public with an
opportunity for notice and comment on the remedy.14  Because of the
emergency and short-term nature of removal actions, such report
preparation and public notice and comment are not always required. 5
In addition to the section 107(a) cost recovery provisions,' the federal
government (and only the federal government) may seek judicial relief
under CERCLA section 106 to require a responsible party to abate an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or to
the environment as a result of a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance.' 7  CERCLA also creates a right to contribution under section
113(f) "during or following" a section 106 or 107(a) civil action asserted
against a plaintiff seeking contribution from other responsible parties.'
CERCLA's contribution provisions provide that (1) section 113(f)
settlements "shall be governed by federal law;" (2) "[i]n resolving
contribution claims the court may allocate response costs among liable
parties using . .. equitable factors;" (3) nothing in section 113(f) diminishes
contribution rights in the absence of section 106 or 107 action; (4) a
responsible party who resolves its CERCLA liability with the government
in a settlement may seek contribution from a non-settling responsible party;
and (5) a settling responsible party "shall not be liable for claims for
contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement." 9
In addition to the cost recovery and contribution provisions under
CERCLA sections 107(a) and 113(f), federal and state governments and
tribes may seek recovery for damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from a release. 20 Liability under CERCLA is
retroactive, joint, and several and is imposed on current as well as past
13. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.435-300.440.
14. Id § 300.430.
15. See id. §§ 300.410-300.415.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
17. Id § 9606.
18. Id § 9613(f).
19. Id.
20. See id. § 9601(16).
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owners and operators of facilities where there has been a release of a
hazardous substance, as well as on those who have generated or transported
hazardous substances. 2 1 The broad nature of the liability coupled with the
ability of private parties to recover under CERCLA has made CERCLA a
powerful vehicle to recover costs associated with contamination resulting
from a wide range of harmful substances.
Despite its broad liability provisions, CERCLA has significant
limitations. Private parties are limited to recovering "response costs" or
monies paid toward a cleanup under section 107(a). 22 CERCLA does not
provide a means for private parties to recover damages associated with
personal injury, diminution in property value (often called "stigma
damages"), lost profits, lost rents, or other damages that are typically
associated with contaminated property.23 CERCLA also does not allow for
plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees and expert fees associated with the
extensive litigation that is often necessary to recover response costs.24
Moreover, Congress defined the term "hazardous substance" to exclude
petroleum and natural gas, which means the widespread contamination
resulting from activities such as petroleum refining, gas stations spills, and
natural gas pipeline leaks is not covered by CERCLA at all.2 5 Thus, while
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006); see also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, & POLICY 370-71 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing retroactivity of
CERCLA's liability provisions).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (limiting recovery to "response costs").
23. See id; COOKE, supra note 1, § 16.01[8] (collecting cases holding that lost business
profits and diminution in value to property are not within the definition of response costs); Joseph
L. Falcone III & Daniel Utain, Comment, You Can Teach An Old Dog New Tricks: The
Application of Common Law in Present-Day Environmental Disputes, 11 VIL. ENVTL. L.J. 59,
60-61 (2000) ("CERCLA does not offer a private plaintiff the opportunity to collect damages
other than those which are necessary to cover the cleanup costs of the subject site."); see also
James R. Zazzali & Frank P. Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies? The Report
and Recommendation of the Superfund Study Group, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 446, 458-63 (1983)
(summarizing report of Superfund Study Group conducted under Section 301(e) of CERCLA to
evaluate the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies and concluding that a
private litigant faces substantial barriers to recovery for property damage and personal injury);
ROGER W. FINDLEY, DANIEL A FARBER & JODY FREEMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 842-45 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing inability to recover for personal injury
and property damage under CERCLA as well as conclusions of Superfund Study Group).
24. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994).
25. See 42 U.S.C. §9601(14)(F) ("The term [hazardous substance] does not include
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or
designated as a hazardous substance under paragraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the
term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable
for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas)."). Courts interpreting the exclusion
have generally held that the petroleum exclusion covers crude oil, crude oil fractions, and
hazardous substances that are indigenous to crude oil or are typically added to crude oil during the
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CERCLA has been monumental in governmental and private party efforts
to remediate contaminated property and recover those costs from
responsible parties, there remain significant types of contamination and
damages CERCLA does not cover, and thus state statutory law and
common law continue to play an important role.26
B. State Statutory Claims Related to Contaminated Property
Several states have their own superfund-type statutes that allow
plaintiffs to recover response costs in a manner similar to that provided
under CERCLA.27 In contrast with CERCLA, however, some state
superfund statutes, such as those in Alaska, Minnesota, and Washington,
allow recovery for personal injury, lost profits, diminution in value to
property, attorneys' fees, expenses, or other losses stemming from the
contamination of property or harm to human health and the environment.28
Minnesota's superfund statute, MERLA, is a good example of how at least
one state modeled its statute after CERCLA but included additional
provisions to provide less liability for defendants in some situations and
refining process, such as benzene, toluene, xylene, ethyl benzene and lead. See, e.g., United
States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1199 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding re-refined used motor oil that picked
up PCBs, sulfuric acid and other contaminants during re-refining process not covered by the
exclusion because PCBs and sulfuric acid do not occur naturally in crude oil); Cose v. Getty Oil
Co., 4 F.3d 700, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (petroleum exemption did not apply to crude oil tank bottoms
disposed on land where solids and liquids had separated from the crude oil); United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992) (mineral oil emulsion that picked up traces
of hazardous substance during production process not covered by exclusion because used oil was
contaminated during production process); Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989) (exclusion exempted refined, leaded gasoline from CERCLA
coverage even though it contained substances which, on their own, would have met the definition
of hazardous substance).
26. Congress provided an explicit savings provision to ensure that those costs not recoverable
under CERCLA could still be recovered under other statutes and the common law. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9652(d); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 9652 "is to preserve to victims of toxic wastes the other remedies they may
have under federal or state law."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999). See also infra notes 102-
105 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA savings provisions).
27. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN § 49-1019 (West 2005) (providing recovery for
"reasonable costs of corrective actions."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452 (providing
"reimbursement for containment or removal costs.").
28. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.422(a), 46.03.824, and 46.03.822(m) (LexisNexis 2010)
(allowing cost recovery and broadly defined damages as well as costs of containment and cleanup
in connection with the release of hazardous substances); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115B.05, 115B.14
(West 2005) (allowing recovery for personal injury, lost profits, diminution in value to property
and other damages associated with the release of hazardous substances as well as reasonable costs
and attorneys' fees); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.105D.080 (West 2011) (allowing recovery of
expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with cost recovery actions).
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more liability for defendants in others.29
For instance, CERCLA's primary liability provision as originally
enacted imposed strict, joint, and several liability on current owners and
operators of facilities regardless of whether that owner or operator caused
any releases of hazardous substances.30 While subsequent amendments to
CERCLA have tempered that liability somewhat, creating the "innocent
,,31
owner exception" and the "bona fide prospective purchaser exemption,
for many years CERCLA resulted in significant liability for many
defendants who did nothing but own property that had been previously
contaminated and who were unaware of the contamination prior to
purchase.3 2 MERLA, by contrast, imposes liability on current owners and
operators of facilities only if they owned or operated the facility at the time
the hazardous substance was placed or came to be located on the facility,
when the hazardous substance was located in or on the facility but before
the release, or during the time of the release or threatened release.33 Thus,
one of CERCLA's most controversial provisions on liability for current
owners was never part of MERLA. Another difference between CERCLA
and MERLA is that in order to recover response costs under CERCLA, the
plaintiff must incur "necessary" costs that comply with the NCP while
under MERLA, response costs must only be "reasonable and necessary."34
MERLA also allows for recovery of costs and damages not available
under CERCLA. CERCLA's primary liability provision allows only for
recovery of "response costs" (i.e., costs incurred for the actual remediation
of contaminated property). MERLA, by contrast, provides for recovery of
those costs but also has a separate provision that allows for recovery of: (1)
damages for actual economic loss, including injury to or destruction of real
29. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ Il 5B.05, 115B. 14 (West 2005).
30. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (relevant portion of statute codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).
31. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101,
100 Stat. 1613, 1616-17 ("innocent owner exception" codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)
(2006)); Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
118, 115 Stat. 2360, 2370 ("bona fide prospective purchaser" codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40),
9607(q)(1)(C)).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland, 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-79 (D. Md. 1986) (finding
that a bank which owned a property but did not contaminate the property was liable for the
contamination and stating that "section 9607(a)(1) [107(a)(1)] unequivocally imposes strict
liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is a release or a threat of release,
without regard to causation.") (quoting New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d
Cir. 1985)).
33. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §1 15B.03, subdiv. 1 (West 2005).
34. See id. § 115B.04, subdiv. 1.
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or personal property, loss of use of real or personal property, and loss of
past or future income or profits resulting from injury to, destruction of, or
loss of real or personal property; and (2) all damages for death, personal
injury or disease, including medical expenses, rehabilitation costs, burial
expenses, loss of past or future income, loss of earning capacity, and
damages for pain, suffering, and impairment.3 1 Moreover, while the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that CERCLA does not allow for recovery of
attorneys fees associated with litigating cost recovery cases,36 MERLA
expressly provides that such attorneys' fees are recoverable by prevailing
parties, along with expert fees incurred in litigating the action. 7
Finally, there are differences between the statutes of limitations
applicable to CERCLA and MERLA actions. Under CERCLA, there are
different limitations periods to bring an action to recover costs associated
with removal actions, remedial actions, and contribution actions. The
statute of limitations to recover response costs associated with a removal
action is generally three years after completion of the removal action.38 The
statute of limitations to recover response costs associated with a remedial
action is generally six years after initiation of physical on-site construction
of the remedial action.3 9 Contribution actions must be brought within three
years of the date of judgment in any cost recovery action under section
107(a) or within three years of the date of an administrative order or
judicially-approved settlement.4 0  In addition, CERCLA provides that in
any action brought under state law for personal injury or property damage
(actions not available under CERCLA), which are caused or contributed to
by exposure to hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants, the state
limitations period may not begin to run prior to the time the plaintiff knew
or reasonably should have known that the personal injury or property
damages were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or
pollutant or contaminant concerned.4 1 Thus, while CERCLA does not alter
any state's limitations period for bringing an action to recover for personal
35. See id. § 115B.05, subdiv. 1.
36. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994).
37. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.14 ("Upon motion of a party prevailing in an action under
sections 115B.01 to 11 5B. 15 the court may award costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney
fees and witness fees to that party.").
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(A) (2006).
39. See id. § 9613(g)(2)(B). If a remedial action is initiated within three years after
completion of the removal action, costs incurred in the removal action may be recovered in the
action brought to recover remedial action costs. Id.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3).
41. See id. § 9658(a)(1).
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injury or damages associated with hazardous substances, it does impose a
"discovery rule" on the accrual of such claims for those states that do not
already have a discovery rule under their own state statutory or common
law.
By contrast, under MERLA, until 1998, an action for recovery of
response costs or for damages had to be brought within six years of the date
"when the cause of action accrues," which was interpreted to mean six
years from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of
the injury and the likely cause.42 In 1998, the Minnesota Legislature
amended the statute to provide that in an action for recovery of response
costs, the action must be commenced any time after costs and expenses are
occurred but not later than six years after initiation of on-site construction
of a response action, thus bringing the limitations period in line with
CERCLA.43 The legislature retained the six years from the time the "cause
of action accrues" language for actions for damages.4 The original
limitations period for recovery of response costs under MERLA was subject
to significant litigation, thus leading to the statutory change, and is
discussed in further detail in Part III. MERLA also provides that while a
plaintiff can bring an action for recovery of response costs for
contamination that occurred at any time within the limitations period, a
plaintiff may not bring an action for economic loss or personal injury
damages arising out of the release of a hazardous substance that was placed
or came to be located in or on the facility wholly before July 1, 1983, the
date of MERLA's enactment.45  Thus, the legislature wished to impose
retroactive liability for cleanup costs associated with pre-MERLA releases
but did not wish to impose retroactive liability for economic loss and
personal injury damages associated with pre-MERLA releases.
Finally, Minnesota has an additional statute, the Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act ("MERA") that has been used to obtain
injunctive relief in contaminated property cases. MERA gives any natural
person, corporation, state agency, or municipality the right to bring a civil
action in district court for declaratory or equitable relief against any person
"for the protection of the air, water, land or other natural resources" within
the state, whether publicly or privately owned, "from pollution, impairment
42. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1I15B.I (West 2005) (amended by 1998 Minn. Laws Ch. 341
(H.F. 3297)); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2000).
43. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.11; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (2006).
44. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.11 (West 2005).
45. Id. § 115B.06.
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or destruction.""6  "Natural resources" include, but are not limited to "all
mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude,
recreational and historical resources" as well as scenic and esthetic
resources when owned by the government.47 A plaintiff can establish
"pollution, impairment or destruction" of natural resources either by
showing the conduct at issue will violate an environmental standard or
permit or by showing that the conduct at issue "materially adversely affects
or is likely to materially adversely affect the environment."4 8
Minnesota courts have interpreted MERA very expansively, broadly
granting citizens standing to challenge state, local, and private actions, and
concluding that the "natural resources" protected under the law include
birds and the trees they nest in, 49 historic buildings,so marsh and wildlife
areas,5 1 the view from a state forest and the wilderness experience in
visiting the forest,5 2 quietude in residential areas, 53 drinking water wells and
46. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (right ofcivil action); id. § 116B.02 (definitions); see
also State ex rel. Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that MERA was modeled after Michigan's Environmental Protection Act and
adopting Michigan courts' four-factor test to determine whether an action's effect on natural
resources is sufficient to justify judicial intervention).
47. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02, subdiv. 4 (West 2005).
48. Id § 116B.02, subdiv. 5. The law is subject to some exceptions, namely that a plaintiff
cannot show violation of a standard solely because of the introduction of odor into the air and no
action is allowed for conduct taken pursuant to any environmental quality standard, license,
stipulation agreement or permit issued by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency or the
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources. Moreover, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the defendant has the opportunity to present an affirmative defense that there is no feasible
or prudent alternative to the action. Economic considerations alone are not a defense. See id; id.
§§ 116B.03, 116B.04.
49. Wacouta Twp., 510 N.W.2d at 29 (holding that bald eagles and trees in which they roost
are "natural resources" under MERA).
50. State ex rel. Archabal v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. 1993) (holding
that a MERA action was available to enjoin county from demolishing historic armory building to
build a jail); State ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 88-89 (Minn. 1979) (finding that
row houses were historical resources protected by MERA and defendant did not sustain burden of
proving no feasible and prudent alternative to demolition).
51. Cnty. of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297-98 (Minn. 1973) (holding that marsh
area is a "natural resource" within the statute, plaintiff met prima facie case of showing pollution,
impairment and destruction, and remanding case for state to present affirmative defense of no
feasible and prudent alternative).
52. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming district court
order temporarily enjoining construction of private radio tower on private land that abutted state
forest based on allegations that the tower would spoil the view and the wilderness experience in
the park and would pose a risk for birds).
53. Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club, 624 N.W.2d 796, 806 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (finding that quietude was a natural resource under MERA and evidence was
sufficient to show gun club violated MERA).
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wetlands.54 Plaintiffs have used MERA to enjoin prospective actions that
include a gravel pit," a shooting range, 6 tree harvesting, a private radio
tower on private land 8 and condemnations for highway and jail projects.
In addition, courts have used the statute to require a party responsible for
contamination to remediate that contamination so long as the plaintiff can
establish that the existing contamination is causing ongoing pollution,
impairment, or destruction of natural resources.o
C. State Common Law Claims
Although not always highlighted in traditional environmental law
textbooks, plaintiffs in many environmental contamination cases continue
to rely heavily on common law claims of trespass, nuisance, negligence,
and strict liability to obtain damages, injunctive relief, and punitive
damages in addition to or instead of CERCLA and state superfund claims.
Sometimes this is because the contamination is caused by a contaminant
such as petroleum or natural gas that is excluded from CERCLA and state
superfund law coverage, so common law claims are the only legal means of
recovering damages and other costs. Sometimes this is because a party
other than the plaintiff, such as the defendant, a third-party, or the
government, is assuming responsibility for the actual cleanup of hazardous
substances but the plaintiff still has incurred damages such as lost profits,
lost rents, or personal injuries. Moreover, depending on the egregiousness
of the conduct, a plaintiff may be in a position to seek punitive damages,
which may dwarf any cleanup costs or other damages, and such relief is not
available under CERCLA or state superfund statutes but may be available
54. State ex rel. Shakopee Mdwakanton Sioux Community v. City of Prior Lake, Case No. C-
01-05286 (Scott County Dist. Ct., Nov. 22, 2002) (finding proposed gravel pit would interfere
with tribe's drinking water well and a DNR-protected wetland and enjoining gravel pit in the
absence of significant modifications).
5 5. Id.
56. Citizens for a Safe Grant, 624 N.W.2d at 800.
57. State ex rel. Wacouta Twp. v. Brunkow Hardwood Corp., 510 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993).
58. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
59. Cnty. of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Minn. 1973) (condemnation for
highway); State ex rel. Archabal v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 426 (Minn. 1993)
(condemnation for jail).
60. See Kennedy Bldg. Assoc. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2004); Werlein v.
United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 898 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 793 F.
Supp. 989 (D. Minn. 1992); Soo Line R.R. v. B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F. Supp. 1472 1486-87 (D.
Minn. 1992); infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
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under common law. 6 1 This Section provides a brief overview of the most
frequently-used state common law claims in contaminated property cases.
1. Trespass
Common law trespass is an unauthorized intrusion or invasion that
interferes with an interest in the plaintiffs property.62 Historically, the
plaintiff did not need to show the defendant's invasion was intentional or
negligent or that there were any actual damages associated with the
63trespass. Under modem theory though, particularly in environmental
cases, courts often require plaintiffs to show the trespass was wrongful in
some way, i.e., intentional, reckless, or negligent, and that the plaintiff
suffered at least some damage from the trespass. 4  Plaintiffs have
successfully relied upon common law trespass in a number of jurisdictions
to obtain injunctive relief and damages associated with air pollution, water
pollution, and property contamination, although other jurisdictions have
placed limits on such claims.65
2. Negligence and Negligence per se
Common law negligence and negligence per se also provide potential
bases for liability for harm associated with environmental contamination.
To establish liability under a common law negligence theory, a plaintiff
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant owed
a duty of care to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached that duty of care,
that the defendant's breach of the duty was the actual and proximate cause
of the plaintiffs harm, and that the plaintiff suffered damages (based on
injury to person or property) as a result of the defendant's conduct.66 In the
context of harm from environmental contamination, the primary issues of
61. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory
State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 583 (2007); Klass, supra note 3, at 905.
62. James B. Witkin, Common-Law Causes of Action for Environmental Claims, in
ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE AND COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 41, 49-54
(James B. Witkin ed., 3d ed. 2004).
63. See id.; JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 385, 400 (7th ed. 2007).
64. Witkin, supra note 62, at 49-54.
65. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 400 (discussing cases); Witkin, supra note 62
at 49-54 (same); Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 221-22 (Colo. 2003) (finding that migration
of pollution from military base to plaintiffs property constituted a continuing trespass and
continuing nuisance entitling the plaintiff to relief); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d
782 (Wash. 1985) (holding that trespass of microscopic particles not visible to the naked eye but
resulting in air pollution could constitute a trespass in addition to a nuisance).
66. See I DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (2001).
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concern are whether the defendant took reasonable care under the
circumstances with regard to the activities resulting in contamination and
whether the defendant caused the harm. With regard to the first issue, there
are various formulations of reasonable care. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides that where an act is one a reasonable person would recognize
as involving a risk of harm to another, "the risk is unreasonable and the act
is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law
regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is
done."6 In determining the utility of the actor's conduct, courts and juries
are to consider the social value the law attaches to the interest to be
advanced or protected by the conduct, the extent to which this interest will
be advanced or protected by the conduct, and the extent of the chance that
such interest can be adequately protected by another less dangerous course
of conduct.68 In determining the magnitude of the risk, courts and juries are
to consider the social value the law attaches to the interests that are
imperiled, the extent of the chance the actor's conduct will cause an
invasion of the interests of another, the extent of harm likely to be caused to
the interests imperiled, and the number of persons whose interests are likely
to be invaded if the risk takes effect in harm.
As is evident, every negligence case involves a balancing of social
costs and social benefits associated with the defendant's conduct. Putting
aside any defenses to liability based on contributory negligence, assumption
of the risk, other actions by the plaintiff that could have resulted in the
harm, or statutory immunities, it may be very difficult for a plaintiff to
establish precisely what as a matter of common law was the standard of
care for contamination that occurred decades prior to the enactment of
CERCLA and other environmental laws or even conduct that occurred in
recent years. Thus, although negligence claims are certainly asserted in
cases involving environmental harm,70 in any case dealing with harm that
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010) ("A person acts negligently
if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to
consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable
likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that
may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm."); HENDERSON
ET AL., supra note 63, at 157 ("The general standard applicable in most negligence cases is one of
reasonable care under the circumstances.").
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292.
69. Id. § 293.
70. See, e.g., Witkin, supra note 62, at 60-63 (summarizing various environmental cases
involving common law negligence claims).
2012] 693
SOUTHWESTERN LA W REVIEW
occurred decades ago, or harm that occurred in a specialized industry, it can
be difficult or at least very fact-intensive (and thus expensive) to establish
that the defendant breached a duty of care. In such cases, the defendant can
argue that it was engaging in "state of the art" practices or technologies for
that time, even if the technology has since developed in a manner that
makes the activity far safer than in the past.71
Plaintiffs often are more successful in establishing negligence under a
theory of negligence per se. Under negligence per se, a plaintiff can
establish negligence if he or she can show that the defendant violated a
statute "designed to protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct
causes and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute
was designed to protect." 7 2 The doctrine of negligence per se applies not
only to state statutes but also federal statutes and federal and state
administrative regulations.73 Since the 1970s, courts have used federal,
state, and local environmental statutes and regulations to help define the
duty of care and to serve as a basis for liability in negligence per se cases.
3. Nuisance
Common law nuisance law provides another means for plaintiffs in
contaminated property cases to recover for harm. Nuisance law is based on
the principle that a defendant may not engage in activity that unreasonably
interferes with public rights or a private party's interest in land.75 Nuisance
law underlies much of environmental law, and has been used by private and
public parties to obtain injunctive and monetary relief from air, water, soil,
and noise pollution resulting from industrial and commercial activities such
as landfills, sewage treatment plants, oil refineries, quarries and the like.
There are two types of nuisance: public nuisance and private nuisance.
A public nuisance is an "unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public" and may only be asserted by a public body (such as a
71. Witkin, supra note 62, at 64.
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 14 (2010).
73. Id. cmt. a.
74. See Klass, supra note 61, at 585 (discussing use of negligence per se in environmental
cases and citing decisions).
75. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 618
(5th ed. 1984).
76. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1 at 112-113, 114-15 (2d ed.
West 1994) (stating that to "a surprising degree, the legal history of the environment has been
written by nuisance law" and detailing the various types of nuisance actions that have been
brought in connection with harm arising from various industrial and commercial activities).
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state or local government) or by a private party who has suffered a unique
or special injury that differentiates his or her harm from that suffered by the
general public." A private nuisance is a "nontrespassory invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land" and may be
brought by anyone with an ownership or possessory interest in land.
Generally, for an activity to be a nuisance, the invasion of the private use
and enjoyment of land must be (1) intentional and unreasonable or (2)
unintentional but negligent, reckless, or subject to strict liability because it
is an abnormally dangerous activity.79 An invasion is unreasonable if the
gravity of harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct or the harm
caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating
for this and similar harm would not be unreasonable.o Once a nuisance is
established, the court balances the benefits of the alleged nuisance activity,
the harm to the plaintiff and others, and other equitable factors to determine
whether the defendant should pay damages to the plaintiff or whether the
plaintiff is entitled to completely enjoin the conduct causing the nuisance.8 1
Notably, even lawful operations that result in harm to public resources
or private property can be enjoined or subject to damages based on
nuisance. In 1998, a Washington state court found that a pulp mill
operating lawfully pursuant to a wastewater discharge permit was liable
under a private nuisance theory for $2.5 million in damages to nearby
potato farmers using irrigation water from the aquifer contaminated by the
82 idefendant's operations. Also in 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court injunction against a metal tube
manufacturer under a public nuisance theory where the defendant's
dumping of hazardous chemicals contaminated a subterranean aquifer.
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 821C (1965).
78. See id. §§ 82 1D-828 (setting forth principles of private nuisance).
79. See id. §822. For a discussion of activities that are considered "abnormally dangerous,"
see infra notes 88-89, and accompanying text.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-27.
81. See id § 936 (setting forth balancing factors for injunctions); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES § 5.7(2) (discussing judicial discretion in balancing benefits and harms in nuisance
cases).
82. Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877, 883 (Wash. 1998) (stating that pollution caused by the
defendant constituted a nuisance even if the state had approved the discharge).
83. California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding lower court injunction
finding that pollution of subterranean percolating waters caused by dumping of hazardous
chemicals was a public nuisance); see also Denise E. Anolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen,
Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING
THE ENVIRONMENT 23-30 (Rechtshaffen & Antolini eds. 2007) (discussing theories of private and
public nuisance and describing cases in which courts granted injunctions and awarded damages
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4. Strict Liability
Unlike nuisance and negligence doctrines, the common law doctrine of
strict liability allows for liability even where the defendant did not intend to
interfere with a legally protected interest or did not act unreasonably or
breach any duty of care in causing the harm.84 Instead, the justification for
imposing liability is that where the defendant has engaged in an activity for
profit that causes harm, the defendant is in the best position to bear the loss
under principles of justice.85 In most jurisdictions, a defendant is strictly
liable for harm associated with contaminated property under either the
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher or for activities that are deemed
"abnormally dangerous" under sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.86 Under Rylands v. Fletcher, a defendant is liable if it
engages in a "non-natural" or "abnormal" use of the land which results in
harm. Under the Restatement, an activity is "abnormally dangerous" and
thus subject to strict liability based on a judicial balancing of the following
factors: (1) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, chattel, or lands of others; (2) the likelihood that the harm that will
result from the activity will be great; (3) the inability to eliminate the risk of
harm by the exercise of reasonable care; (4) the extent to which the activity
is not a matter of common usage; (5) the inappropriateness of the activity to
the place where it is carried on; and (6) the extent to which the value of the
activity to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Courts have held defendants strictly liable under both Rylands and the
Restatement for a broad range of activities that may also result in CERCLA
or state superfund liability, including seeping salt water from an oil and gas
under nuisance theories for polluting activities).
84. KEETON ET AL., supra note 75, § 75, at 534.
85. See Klass, supra note 3, at 907 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 75, § 75, at 536); Mark
Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally
Dangerous Activities, 45 UCLA L. REv. 611 (1998); William K. Jones, Strict Liability for
Hazardous Enterprises, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1705, 1728 (1992); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund
Ursin, The Revitalization ofHazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257, 297 (1987).
86. See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1965); Klass, supra note 3, at 904 (discussing
strict liability under Rylands and the Restatement).
87. Rylands, [18681 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.); KEETON ET AL., supra note 75, at 545-46
(discussing Rylands case).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (2010) (revising the Restatement of Torts
on abnormally dangerous activities to provide that an activity is abnormally dangerous if it (1)
creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is
exercised by all actors and (2) the activity is not a matter of common usage).
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well that contaminated a water supply, the release of toxic and hazardous
wastes from industrial operations and disposal facilities, and the release of
PCBs from a natural gas pipeline that contaminated neighboring property.
5. Damages
Pursuant to any of the trespass, negligence, nuisance, and strict liability
theories discussed above, parties responsible for environmental
contamination may be liable for a wide range of relief, including
remediation costs, diminution in value to private or public property, lost
profits, personal injury, punitive damages (where the conduct was
intentional, outrageous, or was done with a deliberate disregard for the
rights or safety of others), or injunctive relief flowing from harm to human
health and the environment. 90 Courts today are also willing to award
"stigma" damages arising from property contamination in addition to
cleanup costs. Environmental stigma is defined as an adverse impact on the
value of property based on the market's perception that the property poses
an environmental risk.91 Thus, stigma can attach not only to property that is
currently contaminated, but also to property that has a risk of future
contamination or property that has been remediated but is still perceived as
posing a risk of harm.9 2 Although some jurisdictions require some minimal
physical impact sufficient to interfere with the owner's use of the land for
stigma damages to be recoverable, other jurisdictions recognize that the
value of property can decrease through stigma simply by being near
contamination.9 3
89. See Klass, supra note 3, at 942-61 (discussing cases).
90. See Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal
Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 62 (2006).
91. See UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE, Advisory Op. 9, at
A-17 (Appraisal Standards Bd. 2008), available at http://
www.appraisalmanagementcompany.net/docs/USPAP.pdf.
92. See Klass, supra note 61, at 588-590; see also Dealers Mfg. Co. v. Cnty. of Anoka, 615
N.W.2d 76, 77 n.1 (Minn. 2000) (indicating that environmental risk resulting in stigma damages
may be due to fear of potential liability for cleanup costs, potential liability to third parties
affected by existing or prior contamination, or concerns regarding the ability to obtain financing
for the property) (citing Peter J. Patchin, Valuation of Contaminated Properties, 56 APPRAISAL J.
7, 7-8 (1988)).
93. Compare Chance v. BP Chems., 670 N.E.2d 985, 993 (Ohio 1996) (requiring some type
of physical damage or interference with use to recover stigma damages and holding that a trespass
to subterranean rock strata by deepwell injectate is not sufficient) with Dealers Mfg., 615 N.W.2d
at 79-80 (finding that stigma may exist for a property that is merely in proximity to property that
is contaminated because "of the heavy burden on the value of the property due to the perception of
risk of liability, or government imposed restrictions on the use or transferability of the property,
among other concerns.").
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6. Statutes of Limitations
For all common law claims, defendants can take advantage of state
statutes of limitations which limit the time (often between two and six
years) within which a plaintiff may bring a lawsuit for injuries. Many
courts and commentators have argued that proof of continuing harm
supports a claim of continuing trespass or nuisance which prevents the
statute of limitations from expiring until the defendant has abated the
harm.94 Other courts, however, have focused on the conduct as the
triggering event, rather than the harm, meaning that the limitations period
runs from when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the last
wrongful act, regardless of whether the contamination continues into the
future.95
D. CERCLA and Preemption
In cases where the plaintiff brings both a CERCLA claim to recover
remediation costs and state law claims to provide additional grounds to
recover such costs or to obtain other relief not available under CERCLA
such as damages or an injunction, the issue of whether CERCLA preempts
those state law claims can arise. Federal preemption occurs when (1)
Congress preempts state law by saying so in express terms (express
preemption); (2) Congress and federal agencies create a sufficiently
comprehensive federal regulatory structure in an area where the federal
interest is so dominant that it requires the inference that Congress left no
room for state law (implied field preemption); or (3) Congress does not
completely displace state regulation but the state law actually conflicts with
federal law or "stands as an obstacle" to achieving the full purposes and
94. See Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1557-59 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that under
Ohio law, the statute of limitations does not expire because the time period has elapsed from the
defendant's last affirmative act of wrongdoing but instead continues based on proof of continuing
damages); Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc., 676 A.2d 504, 507 (Me. 1996) (focusing on the
hazardous material that remained on the site rather than the dumping itself in deciding whether the
limitations period had run); Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 223 (2003) (holding that under
Colorado law, continuing migration of contaminants and ongoing presence of contaminants
constitute a continuing trespass and continuing nuisance rendering the plaintiff's claim timely);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 161(1) and 899 (1965) (discussing continuing nature of
trespass when defendant fails to remove a thing from land that was wrongfully placed there).
95. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Texaco, 646 N.E.2d 398, 399 (Mass. 1995) (finding plaintiffs'
claim for damage due to contamination from leaking petroleum tank was time-barred because they
failed to sue within three years of the last instance of unlawful conduct and a continuing nuisance
or trespass must be based on "recurring tortious or unlawful conduct, and is not established by the
continuation of harm caused by previous but terminated tortious or unlawful conduct.").
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objectives of Congress (implied conflict preemption).96
Preemption issues raise concerns regarding federalism because the U.S.
Constitution sets out a system of dual sovereignty between the federal
government and the states. The federal government has enumerated powers
that are limited in scope but are supreme within its realm of authority while
the states have residual broad and plenary powers.97 Moreover, apart from
the few areas in which the Constitution grants the federal government
exclusive authority, there are many areas that are subject to concurrent and
overlapping federal and state regulation. This federalist system assures "a
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of
a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry." 99 In order to avoid excessive
displacement of state law in our federalist system, courts generally apply a
''presumption against preemption of state law" where Congress is regulating
in an area of "traditional state concern," which includes the areas of public
health, safety, and the environment.' 00
In the context of CERCLA and preemption, the inquiry begins with a
determination of whether Congress intended that CERCLA preempt state
law completely, partially, or not at all. On that basic level, virtually all
courts are in agreement that Congress did not intend to preempt the field of
hazardous substance remediation and did intend to leave considerable room
for state law.101  The question is, how much? Several provisions of
96. See Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citing
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225,
226-28 (2000) (describing the three types of preemption). The doctrine of federal preemption is
based on the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution, which states that the Constitution and
U.S. laws "shall be the supreme law of the Land" notwithstanding any state law to the contrary.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
97. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
98. See Nelson, supra note 96, at 225 ("The powers of the federal government and the
powers of the state overlap enormously. Although the Constitution makes a few of the federal
government's powers exclusive, the states retain concurrent authority over most of the areas in
which the federal government can act.").
99. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
100. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) ("[B]ecause the
States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress
does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)); Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 715 (discussing the "presumption that state or
local regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated under the Supremacy
Clause.").
101. See Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 277 n.245.
2012] 699
SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW
CERCLA provide a partial answer. First, section 114 states that "[n]othing
in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State
from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the
release of hazardous substances within such State."' 02 CERCLA also states,
however, that any person who receives compensation for removal costs or
damages or claims under CERCLA shall be precluded from recovering
compensation for the same removal costs or claims or damages under any
other state or federal law, and vice versa.103 Second, section 302(d) states
that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State law,
including common law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances or
other pollutants or contaminants.""" Third, section 301(h) states that
CERCLA "does not affect or otherwise impair the rights of any person
under Federal, State, or common law, except with respect to the timing of
review as provided in § 9613(h)."'0o Thus, it is fairly clear that CERCLA
did not intend to occupy the field of hazardous substance remediation and
intended to preserve a significant role for state law.
Courts have struggled with the extent of CERCLA preemption in two
main areas. First, whether plaintiffs who incur response costs without
complying with the NCP should be able to recover those costs under state
superfund statutes or state common law claims such as nuisance,
negligence, or strict liability if the costs are recoverable under those legal
theories. Second, whether plaintiffs should be able to bring state law claims
for contribution, restitution, unjust enrichment, and the like despite
CERCLA's contribution provision under section 113(f).
Although there is variation in the case law, some consensus does exist.
With regard to whether plaintiffs who incur response costs without
complying with the NCP should be able to recover those costs under state
superfund statutes, most courts have found that such state law claims are
viable.' 06 Courts also have generally found that state common law claims
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (2006).
103. See id. §9614(b).
104. See id. § 9652(d).
105. See id. § 9659(h).
106. See, e.g., City of Waukegan, Ill. v. National Gypsum Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1011
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding claims available under the Illinois Water Pollution Discharge Act that
would not otherwise be available under CERCLA, including recovery for cleanup costs not in
compliance with the NCP); One Wheeler Road Assocs. v. Foxboro Co., No. Civ. A. 90-12873,
1995 WL 7911937 at *12 (D. Mass. Dec. 13, 1995) (allowing for recovery of attorneys' fees
under state environmental statute in a case where other damages were awarded under CERCLA);
Vill. of DePue v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 787 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that a local
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for nuisance, negligence, strict liability, trespass and other substantive tort
theories are not subject to preemption under CERCLA despite failure to
comply with the NCP, and that damages and other relief not available under
CERCLA can be recovered under such state law claims. 0 7 Moreover, in at
least one case where a plaintiff brought claims for negligence, nuisance and
trespass, the court found that CERCLA did not preempt recovery of future
damages under state law even though such relief was not available under
CERCLA.'s
As to whether plaintiffs should be able to bring state law contribution,
restitution, unjust enrichment, and other similar claims, most courts have
found that such state law claims would disrupt CERCLA's contribution
scheme and interfere with the settlement protection the federal statutes
provides.'09 Circumstances exist, however, in which courts have found
CERCLA does not preempt these state claims. In New York v. West Side
claim was preempted by a state claim, but that CERCLA does not apply to a consent order
handled only at the state level); N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Minn. Mining and Mf'g Co., No. 06-
2612, 2007 WL 2027916 at *6 (D.N.J. Jul. 5, 2007) (finding no preemption of state law claims in
a removal action and reasoning that preemption "would disturb the congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities."). For a fuller discussion of CERCLA
preemption of state law claims see Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 284-292.
107. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown Grp. Retail, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1192 (D.
Colo. 2009) (finding that claims including negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities were not preempted because they provided for recovery not
otherwise provided under CERCLA); Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma v. Blue Tee Corp, No. 03-CV-
0846, 2009 WL 455260 at *6 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 23, 2009) (finding that plaintiffs could recover
under state common law claims for nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, strict liability, and natural
resources damages because any interference with CERCLA compliance was too remote). But see
Ashtabula River Corp. Group II v. Conrail, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985-86 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(finding that common law nuisance claim seeking recovery for the same costs as claims made
under CERCLA was preempted when CERCLA claims were barred because of CERCLA Section
114 prohibiting duplicative recoveries); see also Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 314-317 (discussing
"Generic Preemption of State Common Law Claims").
108. Walnut Creek Manor, LLC v. Mayhew Ctr., LLC, No. C 07-5664 CW, 2010 WL 653661
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2010). The court clarified that double recovery was not a concern
because CERCLA expressly limits double recovery and, therefore, if the party were to bring later
claims for damages under CERCLA, those claims would be precluded. Id. at *5. For a discussion
of preemption of future cleanup costs see Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 301-03 (discussing case
law in which CERCLA preempted future recovery).
109. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 139 (2d
Cir. 2010) (finding that state indemnification and unjust enrichment claims are preempted by
CERCLA); Chitayat v. Vanderbilt Assocs., 702 F. Supp. 2d 68, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (state law
contribution and unjust enrichment claims are preempted by CERCLA contribution claims); Ford
Motor Co. v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., No. 08-CV-13503-DT, 2009 WL 3190418 at *18 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 29, 2009) (ruling that the plaintiffs could not assert common law indemnification
claims as a fallback if the CERCLA claims fail). For further discussion of CERCLA preemption
of state law contribution claims, see Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 308-14, 312 n.399.
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Corp, 0 a district court distinguished one of the most frequently cited
contribution preemption cases, Bedford Affiliates v. Sills,"' in situations
where the plaintiff asserting the state claims is not a PRP.112 The district
court ruled both that conflict preemption could not apply where there was
no claim under CERCLA section 113, and that the potential for double
recovery was not enough to trigger preemption.' '3 In addition, in Board of
County Commissioners v. Brown Group Retail,' 14 the district court found
that because the plaintiffs unjust enrichment and other similar state law
claims sought relief that was not identical to that pursued under the
CERCLA claims, the state claims were not preempted." 5  These cases
aside, however, in most cases courts generally have found state law
contribution, indemnity, and similar claims preempted.
In addition to the viability of state statutory and common law claims,
another group of cases addresses federal preemption in the context of
whether CERCLA's "federal-required commencement date" preempts state
law claims for damages where the applicable state limitations period has
expired. Typically, when interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 9658, courts have found
that CERCLA's authority preempts state statute of limitations accrual dates
that would otherwise time bar state law claims, reasoning that where the
deadline provided by CERCLA is more generous, preemption is
appropriate."' 6 As one court reasoned, "CERCLA is a remedial statute
110. 790 F. Supp.2d 13, 22 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
111. 156 F.3d. 416 (2d Cir. 1998).
112. West Side Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Specifically, in New York v.
West Side Corp., the court described Bedford's reach as "diminished or outright neutralized" in a
CERCLA § 107 action because the state is bringing the cost recovery action, not private PRPs. Id.
See also Aronovsky, supra note 2, at 309-10 (describing Bedford as a "frequently cited case[]"
addressing the issue of CERCLA preemption of state law contribution claims).
113. West Side Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d at 13, 23, 26.
114. 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Colo. 2009).
115. Id. at 1192-95 (stating specifically, "[p]laintiff seeks monetary damages that are
unavailable to private parties under CERCLA."). It should also be noted that the decision was on
a motion to dismiss, and the court indicated that regardless of any preemption question, the claims
could stand because the plaintiff could argue alternative legal theories even if only one of those
theories could "bear fruit at trial." Id. at 1192.
116. Barton v. NL Indus., Inc., No. 08-12558, 2010 WL 4038738 at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30,
2010) (applying O'Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc., 311 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002)).
CERCLA states specifically the following:
"In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages,
which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or
contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations
period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law)
provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement
date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the
date specified in such State statute."
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whose terms should be construed liberally to carry out its purposes.""17
Thus, courts on the whole have been careful to limit CERCLA's
preemptive scope, although some courts have arguably applied preemption
too broadly and defendants continue to argue for more displacement of state
law, particularly where the plaintiff may not have complied with the NCP
or is seeking damages beyond those allowed under CERCLA. In these
cases, few of which have actually gone to trial, it is often difficult to
determine whether state law would in fact conflict with federal or law or
whether the two sources of law can work in tandem to meet the goals of
CERCLA, namely, to prompt the timely and efficient cleanup of
contaminated sites and place responsibility for those costs on the parties
most responsible for the contamination. Part II attempts to provide
additional insight into these questions through the Union Pacific Railroad
Co. and Kennedy Building Associates case studies.
II. CASE STUDIES IN CONTAMINATED PROPERTY LITIGATION: UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. V. REILLY INDUSTRIES AND KENNEDY
BUILDING ASSOCIATES V. VIACOM
This Part discusses the facts, motions, trials, post-trial proceedings, and
appeals in Union Pacifc Railroad Co. v. Reilly Industries"8 and Kennedy
Building Associates v. Viacom.'l 9 Both cases were tried in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota to different judges and later went to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Both cases included claims
under CERCLA, MERLA, and various state common law claims including
nuisance, negligence, strict liability, contribution, and indemnity. The
Kennedy case also included a claim under MERA for injunctive relief and
claims for punitive damages under common law. In both cases the state law
statutory and common law claims were ultimately more significant in terms
of the outcome than the CERCLA claims. In both cases the court and the
jury were able to proceed smoothly in distinguishing the different standards
42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2006). But see Angle v. Koppers, Inc., 42 So. 3d 1, 8-9 (Miss. 2010) (finding
that appellant failed to provide any evidence in the record that CERCLA preempted the state
statute of limitations and thus the district court was correct in dismissing her claims as time-barred
under state law).
117. Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1237 (S.D. Ala. 2009);
see also McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 783 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that "Congress's
primary concern in enacting § 309 was to adopt the discovery rule in situations where a plaintiff
may lose a cause of action before becoming aware of it . . .
118. 215 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2000).
119. 476 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 2007).
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under the various federal and state law claims as evidenced by the findings,
conclusions, jury instructions, and special verdicts. In one case, the
defendant prevailed; in the other case, the plaintiff partially prevailed.
Sections A and B discuss each of the cases in turn while Section C provides
some observations and reflections on the cases.
A. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Reilly Industries
1. Background Facts
The Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Reilly Industries case involved a
23.8 acre parcel of property that is now part of the University of Minnesota
campus in Minneapolis.12 0 From 1903 to 1919, the Chicago Great Western
Railway Co. leased five acres of the property to Republic Creosoting Co.
which operated a wood creosoting facility at the site. 12 1 According to
evidence produced in the case, Republic treated various types of wood
products including wood paving blocks, railroad ties, and telephone poles
with creosote oil, which is a distillate of coal or wood tar and consists of
polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons ("PAHs"), which are hazardous
substances.12 2 In 1968, the Chicago Great Western Railway Co. merged
with the Chicago and North Western Railway ("CNW") Co.,123 which was
in turn acquired by Union Pacific Railroad Co. in 1995.124 For its part,
Republic Creosoting Co. in later years changed its name to Reilly Tar and
Chemical Co. and then to Reilly Industries.125
In 1987, the Minneapolis Community Development Agency
("MCDA") entered into an agreement with CNW to conduct tests on the
property to assess environmental concerns associated with a potential
purchase of the property. 26 Barr Engineering prepared a report in which it
identified creosote contamination at the site and recommended further work
to determine the vertical and horizontal extent of contamination if MCDA
decided to move further on the site.12 7 Evidence at trial established that a
120. Reilly, 215 F.3d at 832-33.
121. Id at 832.
122. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (D. Minn. 1997).
123. Id
124. Id at 1234.
125. Memorandum in Support of Reilly's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Union Pac.
R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1229 (D. Minn. 1997) (No. 4-95-960) [hereinafter
Reilly Memorandum].
126. Reilly, 981 F. Supp. at 1231.
127. Id
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representative of MCDA gave the Barr report to a representative of CNW in
January 1988.128 The MCDA ultimately did not purchase the site.129 In
1990, the University of Minnesota negotiated with CNW to purchase the
site. 130 CNW retained Dahl & Associates to investigate the environmental
condition of the site.13 ' Dahl obtained a 1912 map of the area which
showed the Republic Creosoting facility on the northeast portion of the
property.13 2 Dahl conducted a subsurface investigation in that area and
found evidence of PAHs in the area of the former Republic facility. 33
CNW and the University finalized the purchase agreement for the
property in July 1990.134 As part of the agreement, CNW agreed to
remediate the contaminated portion of the property.'35 It enrolled the site in
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency's ("MPCA's") Voluntary
Investigation and Cleanup ("VIC") program and began working with the
MPCA regarding a bioremediation remedy for the site.136 After disputes
about the appropriate level of cleanup for the site, CNW ultimately
proceeded with a more expensive, thermal desorption remedy in late 1994
and early 1995, incurring just over $1 million in remediation costs.13 7 Prior
to the remediation, there were two public meetings regarding the site. 3 1 In
August 1994, the MPCA sent a notice to residents in the area regarding a
community meeting on several different cleanup actions in the
neighborhood, one of which was the former Republic site cleanup.'3 9 A
fact sheet distributed at the meeting described redevelopment opportunities
at the site, stated that bioremediation had been considered and discarded as
a potential remedy, and that landfilling options had also been considered
and rejected.14 0  In October 1994, CNW submitted a Remedial Action
Workplan for the thermal desorption remedy to the MPCA, MPCA gave
verbal approval for the remedy on November 14, 1994, and excavation of
the site soil began on November 16, 1994 and continued through December
128. Id.; Reilly Memorandum, supra note 125, at 4.
129. See Reilly, 981 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
130. Id. at 1231.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1231-32.
133. Id at 1232.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1232-34.
138. Id. at 1233.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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1994.141 On November 30, 1994, MPCA and CNW held a public meeting
to discuss and receive comments on the workplan.14 2  At the meeting
MPCA and CNW discussed the thermal desorption remedy, indicated soil
excavation for the remedy had already begun, and that the comment period
on the remedy would close the next morning.14 3 Thermal treatment of the
soil occurred from December 28, 1994 until January 27, 1995, after which
the MPCA gave written approval of the remedy.1" CNW did not prepare a
Remedial Investigation or Feasibility Study for the remedy as MPCA did
not require such reports as part of the site's enrollment in the VIC
program.14 5
2. Lawsuit and Pretrial Motions
In March 1994, CNW (now UP) and Reilly entered into a tolling
agreement that extended by one year the limitations period for any claims
involving the site in order to conduct settlement negotiations. 146 Those
negotiations failed, the tolling agreement expired, and UP filed a lawsuit in
federal district court in Minnesota against Reilly in December 1995.147
UP's claims were solely to recover the $1 million in remediation costs
associated with the site under CERCLA and MERLA as well as state
common law claims for trespass, negligence, nuisance, strict liability,
waste, contribution, and indemnity.148 In a 1997 order, the district court
dismissed the CERCLA claims on grounds that UP's failure to prepare a
Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study for the remedy as well as its
failure to provide meaningful public comment on the remedy resulted in a
failure to substantially comply with the NCP.14 9 The court rejected UP's
claim that it could meet the NCP requirements through MPCA supervision
and complying with all aspects of the state's VIC program.15 0 It followed
other courts in finding that state regulatory involvement in the remedial
process cannot substitute for the public comment and report preparation
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1233-34.
143. Id
144. Id. at 1234.
145. Id. at 1237-38.
146. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., Order, No. 4-95-960, slip. op. at 6 (D.
Minn. Dec. 28, 1998).
147. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 830, 833-34 (8th Cir. 2000).
148. Id.
149. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (D. Minn. 1997).
150. Id at 1236-38.
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required for recovery under CERCLA.15 ' The court found that the reports
prepared to meet the requirements of the VIC program did not have the
level of detail and remedy evaluation the NCP required and that the public
meetings regarding the MPCA were merely informational and did not
adequately seek or respond to public comment. 15 2  Indeed, the second
meeting in which the proposed remedy was discussed was after the MPCA
had approved the remedy and site excavation was already underway.15 3
Dismissal of the CERCLA claims left the state law claims for trial, as
the court found that disputes of fact over whether those claims were timely
precluded summary judgment.' 5 4  Both parties agreed that a six-year
limitations period applied to all the state statutory and common law
claims. 55 UP argued as matter of law that the MERLA claim should not
accrue until UP began to incur costs associated with the sitel 5 6 and that the
harm was continuing until the contamination was remediated, both of which
would render the MERLA claim timely.15 7 Prior to trial, Reilly argued that
once the CERCLA claim had been dismissed, there was no justification for
applying CERCLA's provision preempting state law accrual dates for
statutes of limitations, and that under Minnesota law the claims should
accrue at the time of contamination, not knowledge of contamination.?
The court rejected all of those arguments and found that the MERLA claim
and the common law claims under Minnesota law accrued when UP knew
or should have known of its injury and the likely cause.15 9 It rejected UP's
continuing harm argument160 and also rejected Reilly's argument that
Minnesota law would result in an accrual date prior to knowledge of the
contamination.16' The court also found in favor of UP that its nuisance
151. Id. at 1236-37.
152. Id. at 1238.
153. Id. at 1237.
154. The district court initially dismissed the state law claims without prejudice when it
dismissed the CERCLA claims for lack of federal question jurisdiction. Id at 1238. On a motion
for reconsideration, the district court agreed to hear the state law claims because diversity
jurisdiction between the parties still existed. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 95-
CV-960, 1998 WL 1768404 at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 1998). The district court ultimately rendered
its decision on the state law claims following a jury trial. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus.,
Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 860, 864-865 (D. Minn. 1998).
155. Reilly, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 865.
156. Id. at 864.
157. Id. at 866.
158. Id. at 864.
159. See id. at 865.
160. Id. at 867.
161. Id. at 865.
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claim could proceed against Reilly because nothing in Minnesota's private
nuisance statute limited the claim to disputes between neighbors rather than
162
successors in interest or landlords and tenants on the same property.
3. Trial and Appeal
At trial in August 1998, UP pursued its remaining MERLA, nuisance,
trespass, waste, strict liability, contribution, and indemnity claims. 6 3
Because the MERLA claims (like CERCLA claims) are considered
equitable in nature, the jury was advisory on the MERLA claims with the
court making the ultimate factual and legal findings.'" UP had to establish
that its claims were timely,'65 that its costs were "reasonable and necessary"
under MERLA,'66 and that it met the substantive elements of the common
law claims.16 7 At trial, Reilly argued that the costs were not reasonable and
necessary under MERLA because UP could have used less expensive
remedies of bioremediation or landfilling instead of thermal desorption.16 1
Reilly also put in evidence that at least some of the contamination resulted
from UP's own operations on the site before and after Reilly's lease period
and that Reilly's operations in creosoting railroad ties were to benefit UP.
Finally, Reilly argued that representatives of UP had knowledge of the
creosote contamination for decades as creosote contamination is highly
visible170 and has a strong odor 71 and at the very latest knew of the
contamination when it received the Barr Engineering report in January
1988.172
In its special verdict, the jury found that the "reasonable and necessary"
costs UP incurred were only $600,392 of the $1 million claimed, that both
UP and Reilly were responsible parties under MERLA, that the response
costs should be allocated 15% to UP and 85% to Reilly, that UP failed to
prove trespass, nuisance, and waste claims against Reilly, that UP did prove
its strict liability claim against Reilly, and that all the state law claims were
162. Id. at 867.
163. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 4-95-960 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 1998).
164. Id. at 4.
165. See id. at 5-6.
166. Id. at 7-8.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Transcript of Closing Arguments at 37-42, Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No.
4-95-960 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 1998).
169. Id. at 32-34.
170. Id. at 12-13.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 21-22.
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time-barred because UP knew or should have known that the property was
damaged by creosote more than seven years (six years plus the one-year
tolling agreement) before UP filed the lawsuit.' 73  On the strict liability
claim, the court had determined as a matter of law prior to trial that Reilly's
activities on the site were sufficient to warrant strict liability under the
Rylands v. Fletcher standard, and thus the only factual issue for the jury to
determine was whether Reilly caused the contamination on the site.174
The court then issued proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
on the MERLA claims and the remaining equitable claims of contribution
and indemnity in an order dated December 28, 1998.'17 The district court
agreed with the jury that there was evidence to support the claim that UP
knew or should have known of the creosote contamination as a result of
receiving the Barr Engineering report and likely earlier because the
contamination would have been open and obvious to representatives of
UP's corporate predecessors well prior to that time.176 Thus, the claims
were time-barred.'7 7 The court also adopted the jury's advisory findings on
the amount of reasonable and necessary response costs' as well as the
allocation of responsibility between UP and Reilly.17 9
The court rejected the contribution and indemnity claims as a matter of
Minnesota state law.' 80 The court found there was no express contractual
relationship or implied legal duty that required Reilly to indemnify UP'
and that there was no common liability between joint tortfeasors that would
result in a valid claim for contribution.18 2 The court rejected UP's argument
that the common liability arose out of the fact that both UP and Reilly were
responsible for remediating the property under the statutory framework set
out in MERLA.18 3 The court found that while MERLA created a general
statutory duty, in the current lawsuit, UP was the plaintiff and Reilly was
173. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 4-95-960, slip op. at 1-3 (D. Minn. Dec.
28, 1998).
174. The Court's Instructions to the Jury at 32, Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc, No.
4-95-960 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Reilly Jury Instructions].
175. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 4-95-960, slip op. at 4-15 (D. Minn. Dec.
28, 1998).
176. Id. at 4-6.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 7-8.
179. Id at 8.
180. Id. at 9-15.
181. Id at 11.
182. Id at 12.
183. See id. at 13.
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the defendant and at no prior time had a third party been mutually aligned
against them. 184 The court also rejected UP's equitable argument that
leaving it without a remedy was unfair because it had discharged a legal
duty imposed by law to clean up property contaminated by Reilly.'s The
court found that this was not a case where UP was without a legal remedy
for recovering its cleanup costs; MERLA provided precisely that remedy
and UP was at fault for not bringing the claim soon enough to take
advantage of it and no equitable factors mitigated UP's failure to bring a
timely claim.186  Thus, the jury and court's findings resulted in UP
recovering nothing on its claims since its CERCLA claims had been
dismissed on summary judgment and all of its remaining state law claims
were found to be time-barred. After trial, Reilly sought to recover its
attorneys fees as a "prevailing party" under MERLA but the district court
held that even though the statute referred to "prevailing party," MERLA
should be interpreted to allow attorneys fee recovery only for prevailing
plaintiffs, and thus Reilly could not recover its fees under the statute.18 7
Notably, the jury instructions in the case illuminate many of the jury's
findings that may appear inconsistent or unclear on their own. For instance,
because the CERCLA claims had already been dismissed for failure to
comply with the NCP and because at the time of trial, MERLA's limitations
period accrued at the time of knowledge of contamination rather than the
start of cleanup, UP's knowledge of the contamination was critical to the
case. There was testimony at trial regarding the fact that creosote stains the
soil and has a strong odor even decades underground mixed with dirt, and
that based on aerial photographs of the site at various times between 1917
and the mid-1990s, UP would have seen and smelled the contamination not
only at the time Reilly left the site but each time it re-graded the site for its
own purposes in later decades. 88  Thus, it was important for Reilly to
convey to the jury UP's predecessors' early knowledge of contamination as
well as UP's receipt of the Barr Engineering report. Based on this
testimony, one of the jury instructions stated that notice to an officer or
agent of a corporation acting within the scope of his or her authority is
deemed notice to the corporation and that the knowledge of a predecessor
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 13-14.
187. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 4-95-960, Report and Recommendation at
8-9 (D. Minn., Apr. 23, 2001).
188. Transcript of Closing Arguments at 12-13 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc, No.
4-95-960 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 1998).
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corporation is imputed to the successor corporation.18 9 Thus, Reilly could
argue to the jury that UP missed the statute of limitations based both on
knowledge of site conditions by its predecessors' employees decades ago as
well as the receipt of the Barr Engineering report by one of its agents.
Moreover, with regard to the jury instructions regarding the common
law claims of trespass, waste, nuisance, and strict liability the jury found
UP had proved only its strict liability claim.190 This is not surprising given
that for the strict liability claim, the court had already determined as a
matter of law that the creosoting operations were "unnatural" under the
Rylands case and thus the activity itself was subject to strict liability. As a
result, the jury was instructed to find Reilly liable for strict liability based
solely on causation.' 9' In other words, if Reilly caused at least a portion of
the contamination and that contamination resulted in damages, which Reilly
had fully admitted at trial, then UP had proved its claim. With regard to the
other claims, UP had a more significant burden of proof with regard to
meeting the liability standard as well as causation.' 92
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the CERCLA claims and its findings on the
state law claims.193 With regard to the NCP compliance issue, the court
found that the NCP "is designed to promote cost effective measures to
protect public health and the environment" and that "a private party cannot
recover its reasonable and necessary response costs from responsible parties
unless it has complied with the NCP."l 9 4 It agreed with the district court
that the failure to prepare a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study
along with the lack of meaningful notice and public comment on the
remedy were fatal to the claim despite the MPCA's oversight and
involvement in the remedy selection and implementation. 19 On the statute
of limitations issue, the court of appeals agreed that CERCLA's preemption
189. Reilly Jury Instructions, supra note 174, at 5.
190. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc, No. 4-95-960, slip op. at 1-3 (D. Minn. Dec.
28, 1998).
191. Reilly Jury Instructions, supra note 174, at 32 ("In order to prevail on its claim for strict
liability, Union Pacific must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Reilly's wood treating
operations directly caused damage to Union Pacific and the amount of any such damages.").
192. See, e.g., id at 28-30 (jury instructions for trespass and nuisance). Notably, the district
court asked the jury to answer the special verdict questions regarding the substantive issues in the
case before answering the questions regarding statutes of limitations to avoid a retrial in the event
that the court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling on when the cause of action accrued.
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 4-95-960, slip op. at 1-3 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 1998).
193. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 2000).
194. Id at 835.
195. Id. at 836-37, 838-39.
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of state limitations period accrual dates applied even in the absence of a
valid CERCLA claim. 19 6 It based this conclusion on Congress's intent to
preempt state statutes of limitations if the claims are based on exposure to
hazardous substances and the state limitations period would otherwise
provide for an earlier date.19 7 The court of appeals also agreed with the
district court's analysis on the common law indemnity and contribution
claims.' 98
B. Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom
1. Background Facts and Claims
The Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom case involved
polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB") contamination on a site in northeast
Minneapolis.199 From the 1920s until 1980, Westinghouse Electric Co.
owned and operated an electric transformer repair facility at the site during
which it handled PCBs on a regular basis.200 PCBs were originally thought
to be ideal transformer insulators because they are oily liquids that do not
conduct electricity and are chemically stable and fire resistant.201 As a
result, Westinghouse drained and refilled PCB-containing transformers on a
regular basis at the Kennedy Site for decades.20 2 By the late 1960s, PCBs
were recognized as potential carcinogens and, in 1976, Congress passed the
Toxic Substances Control Act which singled out PCBs as hazardous
substances and required the EPA to prescribe rules limiting their
manufacture, use, and disposal.2 03 In 1979, the EPA banned rebuilding
transformers that contained PCBs over a certain level and ultimately banned
the use of PCBs entirely.204
From 1971 to 1973, Westinghouse undertook a study of sites where it
used PCBs, although the Kennedy site was not one of the sites studied.205
The purpose of the study was to determine whether PCBs were leaking
196. Id. at 840-41.
197. See id. at 840.
198. Id. at 841-42.
199. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2004).
200. Id. at 735.
201. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-CV-1833, slip op. at 2 (D. Minn. May
31, 2002).
202. Id
203. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
204. Id. at 735-36.
205. Id. at 736.
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from the study sites and migrating off the Westinghouse property, and
whether the PCBs could be detected and traced back to Westinghouse.2 06
The head of the Westinghouse study, Dr. Thomas Munson, testified at trial
that he and his team examined several facilities and they found PCBs
wherever they looked.2 07 Munson testified that Westinghouse stopped the
study after sampling of four plants showed PCBs were leaving the site and
showing up in wildlife and fish in rivers as well as in the fish filets from
those rivers that were being sold in nearby fish markets.208 Dr. Munson
testified that it was "a given" that any transformer repair facility was
contaminated with PCBs, that he told Westinghouse top management about
the findings, that the study was canceled as a result of his findings, and that
he was threatened with prosecution if he were to tell anyone outside
Westinghouse about the study or the results.209
In 1980, Westinghouse sold the site to Hillcrest Development without
conducting any investigation or decontamination of the site and without
disclosing the nature of its operations at the site.210 In 1982, Gerald
Trooien, a partner in Kennedy Building Associates, purchased the property
from Hillcrest and transferred the site to Kennedy, which in turn leased
portions of the building to various commercial and light industrial
tenants. 2 11 Evidence indicated that at the time he purchased the property
Trooien did not know or have reason to know that Westinghouse had
disposed of hazardous substances at the site.212 In 1997, Kennedy entered
into negotiations to sell the site back to Hillcrest.2 13 Hillcrest retained an
environmental consultant who discovered the PCB contamination.2 14
Hillcrest withdrew its purchase offer, Kennedy reported the contamination
to the MPCA, and then entered the MPCA's VIC program which required
Kennedy to undertake field investigations of the contamination in order to
avoid being referred to the state superfund program.2 15 Kennedy's
investigations of the property found significant levels of PCBs above state
action levels in the soil and groundwater at the site as well as on surfaces in
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.; Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-CV-1833, slip op. at 3 (D. Minn.
May 31, 2002).
210. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2004).
211. Kennedy, No. 99-CV-1833, slip op. at 4.
212. Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 737.
213. Id
214. Id.
215. Id
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the building.2 16
In 1999 Kennedy filed suit against Westinghouse (now Viacom)
seeking relief under CERCLA, MERLA, MERA, and under common law
theories of nuisance, negligence and strict liability.2 17 At the time of trial,
Kennedy had incurred response costs of approximately $106,000 and the
MPCA had required Kennedy to file a deed restriction against the property
notifying potential purchasers of the contamination and prohibiting any
subsurface activities on the property without MPCA approval.2 18 The
MPCA also issued Kennedy an assurance letter through the VIC program
that Kennedy did not cause or contribute to any contamination at the site.219
Just prior to the trial of the case, the MPCA and Viacom entered into a
consent order in which Viacom agreed to conduct a remedial investigation
and a feasibility study, as well as develop and implement a response action
plan.220
2. Trial and Appeal
At trial, which began in January 2002, KBA sought to recover
approximately $106,000 in response costs, damages for diminution in
property value because of environmental stigma, punitive damages arising
from Westinghouse's deliberate disregard for the rights and safety of others,
and an injunction to compel Viacom to remediate the property.22 Kennedy
sought recovery of the response costs under CERCLA, MERLA, and state
common law; stigma damages under MERLA and state common law;
punitive damages under state common law; and the injunction under
MERA. Thus, the various federal and state law claims provided multiple
grounds for recovery of some, but not all of the relief sought. Although
both parties had moved for summary judgment on several of the claims, the
court denied the motions, leaving all issues for trial.222
During the trial, the jury heard testimony regarding the history of the
site, the nature and scope of the contamination, expert witness testimony on
diminution in value to the property as a result of environmental "stigma"
caused by the contamination, Westinghouse's knowledge of the dangers of
PCBs and the PCB contamination caused by transformer repair operations
216. Kennedy, No. 99-CV-1833, slip op. at 6-7.
217. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 2004).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-CV-1833 (D. Minn. May 31, 2002).
222. See id.
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in general, and evidence regarding Kennedy's own activities at the site
during its ownership.22 3 In its special verdict, the jury found in favor of
Kennedy on both the CERCLA and MERLA claims and awarded it the full
$106,000 in response costs. On the CERCLA claim, it found that Viacom
was 95% percent responsible for the response costs and Kennedy was 5%
responsible for the response costs. On the MERLA claim, the jury found
Viacom 100% responsible for the response costs. 2 24 The jury also found in
favor of Kennedy on the MERA claim but in favor of Viacom on all the
common law claims except for strict liability, where the jury found in favor
of Kennedy.225 As in the Union Pacific case, the court determined prior to
trial that Westinghouse's operations at the site were subject to strict liability
under the Rylands rule, and thus so long as the jury determined
Westinghouse caused the contamination and some damage resulted,
Kennedy had proven its claim. 2 26 In addition to the $106,000 in response
costs, the jury awarded $225,000 in damages associated with environmental
stigma, and $5 million in punitive damages based on evidence that
Westinghouse acted with "deliberate disregard" for the rights and safety of
others, the standard in Minnesota for awarding punitive damages.227
The court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
CERCLA, MERLA, and MERA claims because those claims are equitable
in nature and thus the jury was only advisory on those claims.228 The court
found that Westinghouse knew at the time it owned the Kennedy site that
there were health risks associated with PCBs, that PCB contamination at the
site was virtually certain, and that despite this knowledge Westinghouse
sold the site without any investigation or cleanup of the PCBs or disclosure
of their existence or the nature of Westinghouse's work at the time. 22 9 The
court also found there was no credible evidence that Kennedy or its tenants
brought PCBs on the site or contributed to the existing PCB
contamination. 23 0  Based on these facts, the court found Kennedy was
entitled to recover 100% percent of its response costs from Viacom under
CERCLA and MERLA, as well as its costs, attorneys' fees, and expert
223. Id. at 1-7.
224. Id
225. Id. at 9.
226. Jury Instructions, Number 19, Kennedy Bldg. Assocs v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-CV-1833
(D. Minn. May 31, 2002) [hereinafter Kennedy Jury Instructions].
227. Kennedy, No. 99-CV-1833, slip op. at 10.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 2-5.
230. Id. at 4.
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witness fees associated with bringing the action under MERLA, and
prejudgment interest.231 The court also held Viacom liable for all future
response costs under CERCLA and MERLA.232 With regard to MERA, the
court found that Kennedy proved its claim, and granted injunctive relief
directing Viacom to remediate the site's soil, groundwater, and building
interior to a level that would allow the deed notice on the property to be
removed.233 The court did not disturb the jury's findings on the common
law claims or the amount of actual and punitive damages.234
As in the Union Pacific case, the jury instructions help explain how the
jury may have reached some of its conclusions. Unlike the Union Pacific
case, the Kennedy case contained both a CERCLA and MERLA claim at
trial. The jury found that that Kennedy was 5% responsible for the
contamination under CERCLA but 0% responsible under MERLA.23 5
While this may seem inconsistent, the CERCLA jury instructions made
clear that liability would attach to Kennedy unless it could show it did not
know or have reason to know of the existence of hazardous substances on
the property and that it exercised due care with respect to hazardous
substances on the site.236 The instructions relating to MERLA, by contrast,
stated that a current owner is not a responsible party unless it was actively
engaged in activities involving hazardous substances or knowingly
permitted others to engage in such activities.237 While the district court
found Kennedy 0% responsible under both statutes, there was some logic to
the jury's conclusions. With regard the common law claims, like in the
Union Pacific case, the district court in the Kennedy case determined in
advance as a matter of law that Westinghouse's activities on the site were
subject to strict liability under the Rylands rule. Thus, according to the
instructions, the jury was directed to find Viacom strictly liable for the
contamination upon a simple finding that Westinghouse caused some
contamination on the property resulting in some damages.238 Like in Union
Pacific, the jury found the defendant subject to strict liability but not liable
under any of the other common law theories.239
231. Id. at 10.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 8-10.
234. Id. at 9-10.
235. Verdict at 1, Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-CV-1833 (D. Minn. May
31, 2002).
236. Kennedy Jury Instructions, supra note 226, at Number 10.
237. Id. at Number 14.
238. Id. at Number 19.
239. Verdict at 2-3, Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-CV-1833 (D. Minn. May
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On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the court of appeals did not disturb the
CERCLA and MERLA substantive findings. 24 0 The real money, however,
was in the $5 million punitive damages, which was based entirely on the
finding that Viacom was strictly liable for the contamination, because that
was the only state common law claim KBA prevailed on and thus the only
claim that supported a punitive damages award.24 1 With regard to that
claim, the court held that in the absence of Minnesota authority directly on
point, it predicted the Minnesota Supreme Court would find that the
Rylands rule of strict liability was intended to protect owners of
neighboring property from a defendant's abnormal or ultrahazardous
activities and thus Kennedy, as a successor in interest to Westinghouse with
regard to the property, could not bring such a claim.242 Once the strict
liability claim was dismissed there was no longer any claim to support the
environmental stigma and punitive damage awards and thus KBA's
monetary recovery was limited to the $106,000 in response costs under
CERCLA and MERLA, as well as its attorney's fees, expert fees, and
prejudgment interest under MERLA.2 43
With regard to the MERA claim, Viacom argued that the injunction the
district court issued under Minnesota Statute section 116B.03 was
preempted by the consent order Viacom entered into with the MPCA prior
to trial to conduct an investigation, submit a feasibility study, develop a
response action plan, and implement the cleanup plan for the site.24 The
court of appeals analyzed MERA and determined that the injunction was
only preempted to the extent it conflicted directly with the MPCA consent
order.2 45 The court found that because the MPCA and Viacom had not yet
agreed upon substantive terms of remediation, there was of yet no conflict
between any MPCA order and the district court's order.2 46 The court of
appeals did find, however, that the scope of the district court's order was
too broad. It held that MERA provides a cause of action for declaratory and
injunctive relief to protect pollution, impairment, or destruction of natural
resources and, based on precedent, an injunction under the statute can only
require remediation of past pollution to the extent it poses a future threat to
31, 2002).
240. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
241. See id. at 741-42; see also Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom, Inc., No. 99-CV-1833, slip
op. at 9-10 (D. Minn. May 31, 2002).
242. Kennedy, 375 F.3d at 739-41.
243. See id. at 742, 748, 750.
244. Id. at 742.
245. Id. at 742-45.
246. Id at 744-45.
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natural resources, including soil and groundwater.2 47  Because the district
court's order required a complete cleanup of the site and was not focused
solely on remediating pollution that was contaminating separate natural
resources, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to
limit the scope of its order to conform with the limitations of MERA.248
C. Observations
These two lawsuits illustrate how there can be significant differences
between federal and state law and between statutory law and common law
with regard to claims to recover response costs, seek damages, and obtain
injunctive relief with regard to contaminated property. One might conclude
that this multitude of claims should be avoided. In other words, once
Congress enacted CERCLA and created a private cost recovery vehicle,
state statutes and state common law claims should logically take a back
seat. As discussed earlier, of course, it is fairly clear that this was not
Congress's intent and, instead, Congress intended to leave room for state
law claims that did not conflict directly with CERCLA's provisions. 2 49 For
their part, courts have followed suit and for the most part refused to
preempt state law claims except for contribution, indemnity, unjust
enrichment, and similar claims that may conflict with CERCLA's
contribution provisions and settlement framework.
The Union Pacific and Kennedy cases show why the state law claims
remain important. In Union Pacific, Union Pacific conducted a legitimate
cleanup of the site and removed a significant amount of contamination,
paving the way for further development of the property. If not for Union
Pacific's delay in filing suit, it likely could have recovered at least some of
those costs under MERLA or state common law. Thus, the procedural
burdens of the NCP need not be a disincentive to potential plaintiffs who
247. Id. at 746-48.
248. On remand, the district court granted Kennedy's injunction and ordered Viacom to: (1)
prevent the release of PCBs and chlorobenzenes into uncontaminated soil and groundwater,
consistent with MERA; (2) provide Kennedy and the court with results of all tests for
contamination performed, and if a test shows contamination a plan to remediate it; (3) provide a
plan to prevent further contamination in the event that future development of the site should
require excavation below 12 feet, and remediate any contamination presented by such
development; and (4) advise Kennedy and the court of the identity of corporate successors and
amend information on corporate successors when appropriate. Kennedy Bldg. Assocs. v. Viacom
Inc., 2006 WL 305278 at *3-*4 (D. Minn. Feb 8, 2006), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 476 F.3d
530 (8th Cir. 2007), appeal after remand, 576 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2009), remanded to 2010 WL
3024714 (D. Minn. Aug 2, 2010).
249. See Aronovsky, supra note 2 at 280-82.
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wish to work with state agencies in conducting a cleanup but not take on the
additional delays, costs, and burdens of NCP compliance or attempt to do
so unsuccessfully. With regard to further redevelopment, after paving the
site for parking lots for several years, the University of Minnesota
developed the site into a new, state-of-the art football stadium, saving the
Minnesota Golden Gophers from further seasons in the beleaguered
Metrodome and bringing football back on campus for the first time in
decades. In 2011, the University filed a lawsuit in federal court against
Union Pacific and Reilly's successor, Vertellus, to recover the millions of
additional dollars it spent on further remediation as part of the stadium
development. 25 0 The University presumably intended to argue that unlike in
the Union Pacific case its response costs complied with the NCP and were
"necessary" under CERCLA as well as "reasonable and necessary" under
MERLA.
Moreover, since the initial Union Pacific lawsuit, the Minnesota
legislature had amended the statute of limitations for MERLA so that, like
CERCLA, the limitations period does not begin to run until the remedial
action begins.251 So while claims for nuisance, negligence, strict liability,
and the like would be time-barred (and the University did not bring such
claims), it could bring a MERLA action to recover response costs, damages,
attorneys' fees, and witness fees. In September 2011, the case settled,
leaving for another case the somewhat novel question of whether response
costs incurred to transform a series of parking lots into a modern, Big 10
college football stadium are "necessary" under CERCLA and "reasonable
and necessary" under MERLA. Likewise, in the Kennedy case, Kennedy
was able to seek injunctive relief in an attempt to obtain future remediation
by Viacom even though its CERCLA and MERLA claims limit it to
recovering its own response costs and damages.
These cases show courts and legislatures working to balance the goals
of remediating contaminated property and attempting to create a liability
structure that holds those parties responsible for the contamination (or at
least somewhat associated with the property and its activities) responsible
for the costs themselves. Neither the Union Pacific site nor the Kennedy
site required government cleanup. While the costs associated with the
cleanup of both sites were significant, they were not in the hundreds of
millions of dollars. Is it critical then that the detailed and sometimes
cumbersome requirements of the NCP be followed to recover anything?
250. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., et al., No. 1 1-CV-00056 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2011).
251. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.11 (West 2005).
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Certainly to recover costs under CERCLA it is required but for MERLA,
the costs must simply be reasonable and necessary and to recover damages
under common law, those damages must be only ascertainable and
reasonable. There are state programs in place, like the VIC program in
Minnesota, to ensure government oversight of remedy selection and
implementation and if a property owner wishes to forego a CERCLA action
and seek recovery under state law there are structures in place at the state
level that should allow it.252
Autonomy in this area also allows state legislatures to respond to
developing needs more quickly than can occur at the federal level. While
CERCLA has been amended a few times, it has often taken many years to
"fix" perceived problems that have arisen with the statute such as concerns
regarding lender liability and the perceived unfairness of liability for current
owners who did not contribute to the contamination but are held responsible
for hundreds of millions of dollars in response costs. 2 53 By contrast, while
state legislatures also move slowly, they can move more quickly than
Congress in many cases. For instance, at the same time the Union Pacific
case was working its way through the courts, the State of Minnesota had
brought a CERCLA and MERLA case against a responsible party after that
party refused to remediate a site and the state took over responsibility for
the cleanup.254 When the state brought its suit, the district court found that
the state had failed to comply with the NCP and dismissed the CERCLA
claim. 2 55 Because the state had known about the contamination for years
prior to taking over the site and filing suit (because it was spending time
attempting to get the responsible party to do the cleanup), its MERLA claim
was time-barred.25 6 Because this could be a frequent occurrence in cases
where the state attempts to persuade a responsible party to remediate a site
before the state takes over itself (as it should and in fact is required to do
252. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.175 (West 2005).
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(iv) (2006) (stating that a lender is not a responsible party
under CERCLA so long as its actions are limited to performing actions typical of a lender); Todd
S. Davis & Scott A. Sherman, Brownfield Sites: Removing Lender Concerns as a Barrier to
Redevelopment, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE To REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 248 (Todd S. Davis & Scott A. Sherman eds., 3d ed. 2010)
(discussing both state and federal reforms to limit lender liability); David B. Hird, Federal
Brownfield Legislation, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 40 (Todd S. Davis & Scott A. Sherman eds., 3d ed. 2010) (discussing
the 2002 Brownfield legislation, prospective purchaser and innocent landowner defenses, and the
limits on CERCLA enforcement against persons using state cleanup programs).
254. Minnesota v. Kalman W. Abrams Metals, Inc., 155 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1998).
255. Id. at 1023.
256. Id
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under MERLA), the Minnesota Attorney General's office lobbied the
legislature for an amendment to the statute. Soon after, in 1998, the state
legislature amended the MERLA limitations period for recovery of
response costs (although not claims for damages) to follow CERCLA and
tie the accrual of the limitations period to the start of cleanup rather than to
knowledge of contamination.257
These are just a few examples in one jurisdiction that illustrate how
federal law, state statutory law, and state common law can provide relief to
plaintiffs in contaminated property cases as well as provide safeguards to
defendants from unfairness through various liability standards, statutes of
limitations, and relief that differs from federal law to state law and from
statutory law to common law. While not all parties were pleased with the
jury's or the court's results, nothing in the cases indicate that the jury's and
the court's application of state law interfered with CERCLA's laudable
goals, or that in order to implement CERCLA's goals it was necessary to
displace state law. Part III goes back to the purposes of CERCLA to
provide some concluding thoughts about CERCLA, federalism, and
preemption.
III. CERCLA AND FEDERALISM
While Congress did not include express purpose language in CERCLA,
the circumstances surrounding its passage shed some light on Congress's
intent. In a House Committee Report, the "Purpose and Summary" of
CERCLA was stated as follows:
"The reported bill would amend the solid waste disposal act to provide for
a national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites and to establish a
program for appropriate environmental response action to protect the
public health and the environment from the dangers posed by such sites.
The bill would provide authorities to the administrator of the
environmental protection agency to take emergency assistance and
containment actions with respect to such sites and establish a $600
million, 4-year hazardous waste response fund to be drawn in equal
amounts from industry-based fees and federal appropriations, to finance
such actions undertaken by the administrator. The legislation would also
establish a federal cause of action in strict liability to enable the
administrator to pursue rapid recovery of the costs incurred for the costs
of such actions undertaken by him from persons liable therefor and to
induce such persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental
257. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.11 (amended by 1998 Minn. Laws Ch. 341 (H.F. 3297))
(West 2005).
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response actions with respect to inactive hazardous waste sites."258
Beyond this legislative history, courts often set forth one or more
purposes of CERCLA in reaching various decisions under the statute. In a
2009 CERCLA decision, the Supreme Court quoted a Second Circuit
opinion which stated that "[t]he Act was designed to promote the 'timely
cleanup of hazardous waste sites' and to ensure that the costs of such
cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for contamination." 2 59 This
statement reflects the most common purposes courts have attributed to
CERCLA, both when courts are addressing CERCLA preemption issues
and otherwise.260
While some courts will choose a particular purpose to support their
conclusions, others have found that both purposes of CERCLA support a
particular ruling.261 In Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp.,262 the Ninth Circuit
issued a declaratory judgment for future contribution damages under
CERCLA, stating:
CERCLA was intended to encourage quick response and to place the
costs on those responsible. Declaratory relief serves these purposes
because all parties, like those in this case, will know their share of costs
before they are incurred. The more liability can be limited and quantified,
258. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(I), at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-6120
(emphasis added).
259. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States et al., 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874 (2009)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Util. Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also
Meghrig v. KFC Western Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (distinguishing RCRA from CERCLA
by indicating that RCRA was not designed to serve the purposes of CERCLA "to effectuate the
cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate those who have attended to the remediation of
environmental hazards."). But see Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Avail Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167
(2004) (refusing to take a position on the purpose of CERCLA and stating that "[e]ach side insists
that the purpose of CERCLA bolsters its reading of § 113(f)(1). Given the clear meaning of the
text, there is no need to resolve this dispute or to consult the purpose of CERCLA at all. As we
have said: '[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed."' (internal citations omitted)).
260. City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 447 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating
that CERCLA has "two primary goals: '(1) to ensure the prompt and effective cleanup of waste
disposal sites, and (2) to assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances [bear] the cost of
remedying the conditions they created,"' while indicating that CERCLA is not meant to hold
responsible every individual who ever held an interest in a property) (quoting Carson Harbor Vill.,
Ltd., v. Unocal Corp. 270 F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001)).
261. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[I]t has
now been over twenty-five years since CERCLA's enactment, and although many of the
provisions remain perplexing, the statute's primary purposes are axiomatic: (1) to encourage the
'timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites'; and (2) to 'plac[e] the cost of that [cleanup] on those
responsible for creating or maintaining the hazardous condition."') (internal citations omitted).
262. 207 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2000).
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the more practical it is for a party to budget and borrow to finance it.
Environmental litigation is tremendously complex, lengthy, and
expensive. The costs and time involved in relitigating issues as complex
as these where new costs are incurred would be massive and wasteful.
Declaratory relief allocating future costs is therefore consistent with the
broader purposes of CERCLA. 263
Some courts choose to focus solely on CERCLA's purpose of
increasing the speed of recovery of cleanup costs. 2 64 In a case that did not
involve preemption of state law claims, the Ninth Circuit stated that "the
purpose of CERCLA is to encourage early settlement between potentially
responsible parties and environmental regulators."265 Using a slightly
different formulation, another court allowed recovery of future damages
under state law despite the lack of authority for such recovery under
CERCLA, stating that "[t]he costs and time involved in relitigating issues
as complex as these where new costs are incurred would be massive and
wasteful" and "[d]eclaratory relief allocating future costs is therefore
consistent with the broader purposes of CERCLA.2 66
Still other courts have focused on CERCLA's purpose of ensuring the
financial burden of cleanups is placed on the responsible parties.267 One
case examining preemption of Delaware law determined that "CERCLA
manifests Congress's intent that hazardous waste sites should be cleaned up
and that those responsible for the contamination should bear the costs." 26 8
The court found that CERCLA did not preempt state law because to find
preemption would put the burden for cleanup on the taxpayers of the state,
rather than on the responsible party.269
263. Id. at 1191 (internal citations omitted).
264. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1332 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that Congress intended
to prevent litigation once a remediation strategy had been adopted under CERCLA in order to
ensure prompt cleanup of contaminated property); United States v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 100
F.3d 1509, 1511 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Congress enacted CERCLA to provide a mechanism for the
prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites.").
265. Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Hearthside Residential Corp., 613 F.3d 910,
915 (9th Cir 2010) (arguing the quoted point as well as a general timeliness argument to support
the fact that current ownership should be measured at the time of cleanup); United States v. City
and Cnty. of Denver, 100 F.3d at 1512-3 (barring enforcement of Denver's zoning ordinance
because it conflicts with remediation action under CERCLA).
266. Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding declaratory
relief for future damages consistent with CERCLA because it helps parties determine future costs
without further litigation).
267. Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) (non-preemption case).
268. Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Penn. v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
269. Id. at 178-79.
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In cases specifically involving preemption of state law, courts have
focused on the role of the states in forwarding the goals of CERCLA. For
instance, in the Bedford Affiliates case, the Second Circuit stated that "it
was not part of the legislative purpose that CERCLA be a comprehensive
regulatory scheme occupying the entire field of hazardous wastes, nor does
CERCLA prevent the states from enacting laws to supplement federal
measures relating to the cleanup of such wastes."270 In another case, the
same court noted that states "play a critical role in effectuating the purposes
of CERCLA."2 7 1
Based on this range of judicial declarations regarding the purposes of
CERCLA, it seems fairly clear that there remains a central role for state law
in achieving those purposes. Allowing plaintiffs to pursue state claims to
recover costs associated with remediating contaminated property does not
result in double recovery, can achieve expedited cleanups without
compromising public health goals so long as state regulators are involved in
the process, and places the burdens of those costs on the responsible parties.
As the Kennedy case shows, a plaintiff can bring multiple state law
claims in addition to CERCLA claims in order to recover not only cleanup
costs but also diminution in property value, lost profits, and punitive
damages, at least where state law supports such damages. Nothing in that
result interferes with CERCLA's purposes of promoting timely cleanup of
contamination and placing the costs associated with that contamination on
the responsible party or its successors. The ability of the plaintiff in
Kennedy to bring both the state law and federal law claims placed additional
pressure on the defendant to work with the MPCA and participate in the
cleanup. Indeed, the threat of damages, particularly punitive damages
associated with the state law claims, likely influenced the defendant's
willingness to work with the state agency just prior to trial after years of
refusing to do so. That Minnesota state law allows for the recovery of
attorneys' fees to prevailing parties provides an additional incentive for
plaintiffs to remediate property and seek recovery of costs, knowing there is
a means of recovering not only those costs but the significant costs of
litigation.
Moreover, as the Union Pacific case shows, a plaintiff can conduct a
cleanup that is acceptable to state regulators but, based on failure to comply
with the NCP, no CERCLA recovery results. One can argue that allowing
state law to serve as a "back-up" to CERCLA can be helpful in cases where
270. Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1998), overruled on other
grounds, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
271. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010).
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it may not be cost-effective to conduct a cleanup of a moderately
contaminated brownfields site that meets all the requirements of the NCP in
terms of report preparation and other procedural requirements, but where
there is sufficient state involvement. Although the plaintiff in the Union
Pacific case was not able to recover under state law because of failure to
comply with the statute of limitations for those claims, the state legislature
was able to respond to that issue and bring the statute of limitations for
MERLA in line with CERCLA. Thus, a future litigant in a similar situation
may be able to recover under MERLA, even if not under CERCLA, despite
a failure to comply with the NCP. This state legislative response shows
how states can often be more nimble than the federal government in
responding to perceived problems with a statutory framework.
Finally, both the Kennedy and Union Pacific cases illustrate that
lawyers and judges can present the facts, law, jury instructions, and special
verdict forms in a manner that allows the jury to address differences in state
and federal laws governing recovery of costs for property contamination in
a systematic way without interfering with federal or state goals. There were
no problems with double recovery, confusion of federal and state law, or a
usurping of federal authority or state authority. Because CERCLA,
MERLA, and the state common law claims are simply providing for
recovery for past harm, the concerns regarding conflicting standards for
ongoing or future conduct are significantly lessened. While the Kennedy
case involved concerns regarding whether the federal court could order
relief under MERA that might conflict with state agency negotiations with
the defendant regarding the level and extent of cleanup, that issue involved
an application of state law only, and did not implicate federalism concerns.
In sum, concerns regarding conflicts between state law and CERCLA
in the context of cost recovery appear overstated. The purposes of
CERCLA leave ample room for state law claims. Moreover, most courts
have been able to apply that principle to avoid preemption of state law
claims with limited exceptions in cases involving contribution claims and
settlement protection. Finally, the example cases show how courts and
juries can implement the purposes of both federal and state law in this area
without creating conflicts.
CONCLUSION
There has been a significant amount of scholarship written about
CERCLA in general, federalism in environmental law, and the importance
of federalism in CERCLA. Now, just over thirty years after the enactment
of CERCLA, there has developed a sufficiently significant body of law in
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this area to reflect on the continuing importance of state law in
contaminated property cases involving CERCLA claims. While most
scholars as well as the majority of courts recognize a major role for state
law in this area, it is often helpful to reflect on issues such as these by
exploring the dynamics of federal and state law "on the ground" in actual
jury trials. This makes it possible to consider whether juries, courts, and
lawyers are able to fully use the unique and different features of federal and
state law to reach a result consistent with CERCLA's goals. This essay's
exploration of the Union Pacific and Kennedy trials shows that it is possible
to fully implement state and federal law in this area without significant
conflict, and that such implementation can promote CERCLA's goals of
more rapid cleanups coupled with placing responsibility for the costs of
such cleanups on responsible parties.
